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ABSTRACT:The objective of this paper is to examine the impact of 
inflation gap from target to nominal interest rate decision of Central 
Bank of Republic of Turkey (CBRT). CBRT has begun to implement 
IT regime explicitly as late as after January 2006, when the country 
could able to reduce its inflation rate below 30 percent  between 2002 
and 2005. We apply VAR technique to series between 2002-2011, in 
which CBRT has implemented IT implicitly and explicitly. Empirical 
findings indicate that the impact of inflation gap to nominal interest 
rate is insignificant.  
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1. Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to give decision about monetary policy 
strategy of the Central Bank of Republic of Turkey (CBRT) by 
estimating the coefficient and degree of relation between the central 
bank’s nominal interest rate policy and inflation gap from target which 
is log consumer price index minus the log of the target inflation rate 
(Mishkin, 2001), and the macroeconomic variables by estimating a 
system of simultaneous equations. The coefficient of inflation gap 
from target to the nominal interest rate is accommodating or used 
systematically for monetary control, because CBRT announces that its 
first aim is to provide price stability, and The central banks may “look at 
every other thing”  but  are focused on inflation (Svensson, 2000) or in the 
words of Bernanke et al. (1999): IT is constrained discretion which keeps the 
economic ship in the desired area in the long run, while permitting central 
bank to respond in the short run.” (Saleem,2010:53). This paper applies 
previously developed methodologies to study monetary policy in 
Turkey for period of 2002-2011 in which CBRT decides to use 
inflation target as a new intermediate target implicitly and then 
explicitly to lower inflation rates and makes it stabilized. This period 
also includes global financial crisis, which hit whole the economies 
over the world.   
 
Examining the monetary policies of the Central Bank around a model 
dates back to the recent past. Starting from the 1970s when the 
monetarist school emerged, the effect of the policies on the product 
and inflation based on various assumptions has been examined by 
many economists. Milton Friedman (1968), Sargent and Wallace 
(1975), Robert J. Barro (1976) have made scientific studies on the 
optimal monetary policy covering the rational expectations theory.
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Following Friedman (1968) and Lucas (1973), Barro puts forward the 
effect of monetary expansion on the output and the prices in 
mathematical terms and thus he moves the debate to new variants 
“within the frame of the shape that Philips Curve should take” (Barro, 
1976). 
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 For detailed information, see Milton Friedman 1968; Sargent, T.  and  N. Wallace,  
‘Rational’  expectations,  the  optimal  monetary  instrument, and  the optimal  
money  supply  rule,  Journal  of Political  Economy,  April,  241-54, 1975, p. 5; 
Robert J. Barro, “Rational Expectations and The Role of Monetary Policy”, Journal 
of Monetary  Economics 2 (1976)  l-32, North  Holland Publishing Company, 
1976, p. 1. 
Under different intermediate target regimes, determining the 
coefficient of inflation gap from target has discussed in the literature 
by several authors. They all concentrated on price stability goal within 
the framework of loss function, and used nominal interest rate with 
output gap in loss function models to find an optimum interest rate for 
central bank, following Taylor (1993) rules. In Svensson (1999), 
Mishkin (2000 and 2004), and Aızenman,Hutchison and  Noy (2010), IT 
regime was modelled and estimated to measure the degree of price stability 
goal and the performance of the central banks. On the other hand in 
Altınkemer (1998), Celasun-Denizer (1999), and Olcay, Karasoy  and 
Kunter (2000) monetary policy reaction function for Turkey was 
investigated.  
 
In those studies mentioned above, monetary reaction functions were 
estimated by Ordinary Least Square (OLS) method separately. While, 
Saleem (2010) and Soderstorm (1999) made their estimations by a 
VAR technique with a  simultaneous equation system. In this paper 
we use VAR  method too, because in endogenous and exogenous 
models the residuals of the equations indirectly affect each other.  
 
This paper investigates an optimal monetary policy of a central bank 
over its deviation from intermediate targets. When we consider 
inflation targeting (IT) regime as intermediate target, an optimum 
policy becomes zero deviation from targeted inflation rate. Central 
Bank of Republic of Turkey (CBRT) has adopted this intermediate 
regime for price stability explicitly or implicitly since 2002. This 
study accounts whether deviation from targeted inflation rate is a 
determinant of optimal nominal interest rate or not on the basis of 
empirical evidence. As we know Until 2002, Turkey has not become a 
potential candidate for IT regime. So this reason, firstly CBRT has 
begun to apply IT regime implicitly, and then after january 2006, the 
the Central Bank announced IT regime explicitly  after reduction of 
inflation rate below 30 percent.  
2.The Conventional Theory for Optimum Monetary Policy: Loss 
Function 
The loss function means expressing the inflation gap and the output 
gap in the quadratic form in a weighted order. As small deviation is 
expected, the central bank aims to minimize the loss function given 
below. This is because if not the structural unemployment but the 
cyclical unemployment concerns the central bank and so the monetary 
policy. Hence, the monetary policy behaves like a central bank in the 
modern sense considering the flexible policy and the real output rather 
than ignoring the business cycle and making a strict targeting 
considering only inflation. From this perspective the monetary policy 
affects both output and inflation. However, control of inflation 
continues to be the primary purpose of the monetary policy 
(Oktar,1998;9). Yet, the equal distribution of the responsibility for the 
control of inflation by the institution conducting the government and 
the monetary policy leads to nobody taking responsibility in real terms 
(Fischer,1996;5). And the possible outcome of this is the loss of 
confidence in the public opinion on the monetary policy and the 
predominance of uncertainty (Oktar, 1998;3).The central bank’s 
expected loss function can be expressed as follows (Leitemo,2008;2): 
 
     
      
 
    
                                                                        
In the equation,  indicates the discount factor of the consumer; L 
indicates loss function, t indicates time and E indicates the forward 
looking expectation operator in the course of t=0. The equation shows 
the deviations in the targeted levels of the targeted variations to occur 
in the future (Svensson, 2003;14). We can take that the discount factor 
approaches the unit value by making abstraction in terms of 
convenience (   ).  
The expression below is written for the loss function 
                   ); 
   
 
 
      
       
                                                                  
    shows the percent value of the difference between the targeted 
inflation and the inflation outturn, and     shows the percent of the 
variation made in/from the output amount.         is a coefficient 
and economically it shows the value relatively attributed to the 
variability/instability in the output gap by the central bank (This 
coefficient also includes the political pressures affecting the 
distribution of the monetary policy (Lohmann
, 
1992;274)).    shows 
the targeted inflation level. If noted, the equation numbered (2) being 
the objective function consists of two terms. The first states the 
variance of the output gap and the other states the variance of the 
inflation rate. This is because one is the square of (   ) and the 
other is the square of (    ) when written more clearly. In this case, 
if we state the objective function in terms of variances as shown by 
many authors (Svensson, 2003;7); we get: 
   
 
 
                                                                        
“Var” represents the variances here. Sargent and Walace (1975) have 
also made similar calculations by connecting the monetary policy to 
the loss function within the framework of the rational expectations 
(Sargent and Wallace, 1975; 5)   
2.1. Application of Loss Function for Turkey. 
The Turkish economy made a drastic switch from export-push growth 
model to market-based policies and outward orientation since 1980. 
After excellent far-reaching structural adjustment starting in 1980, 
including increase the central bank independence, aiming to cope with 
inefficiencies and balance of payment difficulties, CBRT became 
interested in monetary programming as early as 1985, and then 
announced its first monetary programming in January 1990 (Ersel and 
İskenderdeoğlu, 1990:1-2). Monetary programming brought a new 
approach to the central banking  in terms of announcing monetary 
quantities to the public and adapt their plans to the targets (Tacal, 
1993; Yıldırım 1995). After monetary programmings, CBRT decided 
to reduce inflation in a short time and very quickly. For this reason, 
CBRT tried to satisfy conditions for IT regime until 2006, and can 
implement IT in 2006 explicitly.  İn a very short time period (4 years) 
average yearly inflation reduces from 28,8 percent to 8,3 percent. 
However, the standart deviation of inflation has rose (see table 1). To 
sum up, Central Bank of Turkey (CBT) has been making inflation 
targeting openly or implicitly since 2002 in theory and practice. 
 
 
Table 1. Intermediate Regimes and Average Annual Inflation, 
Growth  Rate: 1990-2011 
Variable 
Monetary 
targeting 
Exchange- 
rate targeting 
Monetary targeting 
and implicit 
inflation tageting 
Explicit 
inflation 
targeting 
Period applied 1990-1999 2000-2001 2002-2005 2006-2011* 
Avr. Growth (%) 4,1 5,82 7,63 4,32 
Avr.Inflation (%) 77,6 55,6 28,8 8,3 
Std. Deviation of 
Growth 
6,41 2,7 2,9 6,6 
Std.Deviation of 
Inflation 
17,5 11,9 17,4 2 
*: Datas belonging 2011 is up to September. 
we know that the loss function is an indicator of optimum monetary 
policy for central banks. Even though 9-year data does not make sense 
to test the central bank loss function, we can find the deviations by 
regarding the difference between the inflation targeting and the 
inflation outturn as 12-month periods for CBRT and see the 
application results this way from equation (2) for Turkey. It is easy to 
find the deviations as the inflation target is known in this period. We 
are going to apply Hodrick-Prescott to the industrial production index 
to calculate the output gap.  
Let us make a drawing for Turkey by considering the inflation and 
output gap variances of    function coming up from equation (3). And 
let us assign three different values to  value between (1-0) 
representing the range of significance attributed to the output by the 
central bank.   
       means central bank conducts a policy close to strict 
inflation targeting 
       means  central bank regards the output deviation no 
less than the inflation, 
      means  central bank  regards the output deviation more 
than the inflation. 
Figure 2 shows the results of the central bank loss function expressed 
theoretically and formed by the values between 0-1 for each λ in the 
light of the data in Turkey. When looked closely to Figure 2, it is seen 
that making the loss function minimum formed by the data belonging 
to the time periods when the CBT makes open and implicit inflation 
targeting causes the function to follow a fluctuating course in general 
except λ=0.1 which is close to full targeting. It is also seen that the 
deviation from the target is severe in open-targeting periods, 
especially in 2007 and 2009.  
 
 
Graph 1. The Central Bank Loss Function Under Inflation 
Targeting Regime  
 
Source: Bülent Doğru, “Merkez Bankası Politikalarının Fiyat İstikrarı ve 
Diğer İktisadi Olgular Açısından Değerlendirilmesi ve Türkiye'de Enflasyon 
Hedeflemesi Örneği”, (İstanbul Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü 
Basılmamış Doktora Tezi), İstanbul, 2012. 
The result revealing here is that the central bank should carry out the 
inflation policy without considering the output. Only then, L is able to 
make the loss function minimum.  
 
When we look at Figure 1 reflecting the views of the CBT in this 
issue, it is easily seen that the CBT prefers to give probability space 
target from the point target acquisition by keeping the inflation control 
horizon (the difference between the highest and the lowest expected 
value) wide (Yılmaz, 2011;7). The deviation of the output gap is 
estimated to converge to zero over time.  
Graph 2: Deviation from the Target Value in the Output Gap 
and Inflation Targeting 
 
Source: CBT, Inflation Report - January 2011, January 25, 2011, 
Ankara, p. 17 
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3. Optimal Monetary Policy Model Including Inflation Gap  
Recently inflation gap from target becomes a crucial indicatior for the 
central bank’s confidence gap. Following Mishkin (1998 and 2001), 
Kadıoğlu, Özdemir and Yılmaz (2000), and Amato and Gerlach 
(2002), we have added inflation gap from target to loss function, and 
make a modified model to estimate. The main model, we are 
modifying belongs to Soderstorm (1999).  
 
We are analyzing the effects of the CBT’s policy decisions to keep the 
inflation under control considering Soderstorm’s (1999) model for 
open economies. Soderstrom’s model is the advanced version of 
Svensson and Rudebusch’s (1998) model that does not include the 
interest rates explicitly. In addition to this model, Svensson and 
Soderstorm models are taken a step further by attributing a new 
variable named the success criteria of the central bank in the study.  
Central banks do not follow a rigid aggressive interest policy to keep 
inflation under control because there is a negative relationship 
between the interest rate and investment. The central bank should also 
consider the potential production losses. Taking these into 
consideration, the relationship between the output gap, inflation rates 
and interest rates can be formulated as follows (Saleem, 2010;65): 
                                                                        
   is output gap between potential and actual GDP values. Equation 
(16) shows the linkages between aggregate  demand,its lagged values 
and  output gap. Inflation rate can be expressed with a total supply-
type function in accordance with rational expectations hypothesis. The 
inflation rate in the next period is explained by the inflation rates in 
the current and deferred period and the output gap.       being the 
coefficients of the parameters, the equation of inflation can be 
expressed as follows:
2
    
                                                                             
The central bank considers both the output and inflation together when 
deciding the interest rate (Saleem, 2010;66). It uses the output of a 
simultaneous equation system to do this. Then we need a third 
equation. The output gap and the lagged values of inflation and 
interest rates take part as the independent variables in this equation 
affecting the central bank’s interest rate decisions. Additionally, we 
                                                          
2
 We assume that it does not make rigid targeting (Svensson, 1998) 
think whether the central bank is able to achieve the inflation rates it 
has declared in the inflation targeting regime also affects the policy 
interest rate decisions of the bank. In other words, the success/or 
failure of the bank affects the policy interest rate. And thus, we add to 
the model, established by Saleem (2010), Sodestorm (1999) and 
Svensson (1998) an explanatory variable defined as “ absolutely 
efficient”, an explanation of how much central bank has deviated from 
target or range point it announced before. Providing E is the absolute 
active term, E is found as follows:   
      
    
  
                                                                
Where,   is target inflation rate of the Central Bank and   is the 
actual inflation rate. According to our observation, E decreases when 
central bank reaches its target inflation rate and vice versa. This is true 
because under IT regime, rational expectation of people converges to 
a point with rising of central bank’s credibility over time. Then we can 
write the central bank’s interest equation as follows: 
                                                                           
Where (L) denotes the lag structure of variables and  is a white noise 
variable. It relates the nominal interest rate to output gap, lagged 
inflation, absolute efficient term, and its lagged interest rate. It is 
assumed as an accelerationist type of Philips Curve relationship 
(Svensson and Rudebusch, 1998). 
After these pre-workings, we can represent a standard VAR model to 
express how the central bank has to set the optimum interest rate with 
adjusting output and inflation under given E values, considering 
Soderstorm and Saleem models.  
        
         
      
 
   
 
   
   
         
      
 
   
 
   
  
 
 
        
         
      
 
   
 
   
   
         
      
 
   
 
   
  
 
 
        
         
      
 
   
 
   
   
         
      
 
   
 
   
  
  
Here    is the annual CPI inflation rate,    is the call money rate,     is 
output gap, and    is the absolute efficient term. This VAR model will 
show us behavior of central bank; whether it is moderate or 
aggressive. It also suggests that the central bank is both responsible 
for price stability and maintaining financial stability with the help of a 
compatible macroeconomic situation. Therefore, the modified VAR 
model concerns with the demand and supply side equations in the 
open economy and gets an optimum interest rate from simultaneous 
equation system above. The reason why we use VAR model for our 
empirical estimation is that these three variables have indirect impact 
on each other.  
 
4.Data and Empirical Results 
Our monthly time series for period 2002:01-2011:06 are, taken from 
Central Bank of Turkish Republic electronic data service (EVDS). 
Eviews 6 is used in this article for empirical results.  
 
Our empirical analysis begins  by testing the time series properties of 
the variables concerned. Firstly, we analyze the stability of variables 
we concern. The Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Philips Perron 
unit root tests are used for this purpose as necessary (Harris,1995).  
According to table 1 all variables, except the monthly  inflation 
variable,  appear to have a unit root, and must be differenced once to 
achieve stationarity before vector autoregressive (VAR) analysis. The 
exception one have an order of integration of zero (Günçavdı and 
Mckay, 2003;6). This provides us  to measure the impact of interest 
rate to the output gap, to variable E, which measures inflation gap 
form target,  and its impact on inflation. The maximum lag length is 
found 1, determined on the basis of Akaike Information Criterion.  
Table 1: ADF and PP Unit Root Tests 
Variable Definition 
Unit root test Unit root test 
Level 1
st
  difference 
  ADF* PP* ADF PP 
y Output gap -2.49(0.32) -2.17(0.49) -6.94(0.00) -7.01(0.00) 
i CBT policy interest -1.84(0.35) -2.18(0.21) -2.55(0.10) -7.31(0.00) 
P Monthly consumer 
inflation  
-4.48(0.00) -6.22(0.00) - - 
E Central bank 
success criteria 
 -1.83(0.36)  -4.29(0.00)  -6.84(0.00)  -13.60(0.00) 
-* ADF test is Augmented Dickey Fuller unit root test and PP Philips Perron unit root test. Tested equations 
include trends and coefficients. Values in parentheses are probabilities, and tested period is 2002:01-
2010:03. 
The estimation result of VAR is summarized in table 2. Each column 
represents the equation in simultaneous equation system above. Y, İ, P  
are endogenous variables of VAR, While E is exogenous variable of 
the system. 
Table 3: VAR results 2002:01-2011:06 
 (1) (2) (3) 
                
       0.868* 0.001** 0.001 
       0.061** 0.962* 0.053* 
       -0.095 0.045 0.736* 
      0.003 -0.001 -0.004** 
intercept -8.440 4.332 -24.072* 
Adj. R-squared 0.06 0.80 0.55 
AIC 3.69 3.03 2.90 
SIC 3.82 3.15 3.02 
F-statistic 1.0 23.5 106.4 
Log likelihood -198.4 -161.3 -154.3 
Num.of obs. 110 110 110 
*Indicates significance at 1 percent, ** indicates significance at 5 percent level. 
Definition of regression variables: 
    Log of  inflation  
    First difference of log of nominal interest rate  
    First difference of log of output gap  
    First difference of log of absolute efficient value  
   
The result of unrestricted VAR model, equation 2, explain the 
relationship between interest rate and its one lagged value, output gap, 
inflation, and  E value. According to its estimation output, interest rate 
is determined by its previous value and inflation. The value E is 
negatively related to interest rate but is insignificant and less effective 
on interest rate. We can conclude that in Turkey, output gap and 
absolute efficient term have no impact on interest rate. In another 
saying, Central Bank of Republic of Turkey (CBRT) gives its 
optimum policy interest rate decision regardless of inflation gap from 
target inflation, announced under the inflation target regime (implicit 
or explicit) during 2002-2011. Equation 3 measures the relationship 
between the output gap, inflation rate, nominal interest rate, and value  
E. The output gap is positively related to the lagged value of inflation 
rate, nominal interest rate and lagged value of output gap, and 
negatively related to the lagged value of E. But inflation rate fails to 
explain the output gap in the economy.  
All estimation results consistently show that in Turkey nominal 
interest rate variable appears to be related with the logarithm of 
consumer price index (inflation) and its lagged value in the short-run. 
The results also shows that the difference between actual inflation and 
targeted inflation level, which is definition of value E, has negatively 
related to nominal interest rate, but is insignificant. In other words,  
the value E has no impact on base interest rate decision of the central 
bank. The statistical evidence of the estimation results of VAR 
analysis  is provided by the significant coefficients of the lagged 
levels of these variables in their first difference. This means that the 
central bank has played a discretion policy rather than rules in the 
conduct of monetary policy from an analytic perspective during the 
period. 
 
5.Conclusion 
This paper has examined the role of deviation from targeted inflation 
rate on nominal interest rate decision of CBRT. It also considered 
whether for price stability goal CBRT has implemented its implicit 
and explicit inflation targeting regime by rule or by discretionary 
measures during 2002-2011. 
 
The results indicated that the variable E, deviation from targeted 
inflation, has no impact on nominal interest rate. On the basis of 
empirical evidence, we can conclude that optimum inflation rate 
decision in Turkey is only explained by lagged value of inflation and 
its previous value, and that  CBRT can not control inflation in Turkey 
using interest rate as a nominal anchor, because  relationship between 
inflation an ineterest rate is positive.  
 
The empirical results also showed that although CBRT has 
implemented inflation targeting regime since 2002 (explicitly since 
2006), its monetary policy strategy depends on discretionary policies 
instead policies by rule, because explanation power of coefficient of 
interest rate is less than expected (0.061). This means that interest 
rate does not play a critical role in determining inflation in Turkey. 
 
We also find that output gap is negatively and significantly related to 
the  performance criterion variable E of the central bank. If CBRT 
deviates 1 unit from its inflation target level, the logarithmic 
difference of output gap reduces 0.004.  The fact that this estimation 
output suggests is that  when the central bank keeps its promise and 
can achieve to equal targeted and actual inflations, Turkish economy 
has a potential to reach high growth rates under inflation target 
regime. 
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